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Faith, Heresy and 
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Anshuman Singh
John Rapley’s recent book Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion and How It All Went Wrong 
is a riveting tale of the development of 
economic thought. “This fundamental 
critique of economics,” writes Avinash 
Persaud in his review (“The Corruption 
of Economics,” EPW, 24 February 2018), 
“is a must-read for all.” I argue here 
that although this is indeed a very 
important book for our times, one 
cannot agree with the fi rst part of 
Persaud’s assessment. 
I base my assertion on the following 
counts: It traces developments in the 
core methods and beliefs of mainstream 
economic thought without the concep-
tual rigour such a project demands. (Our 
age requires that the problem of faith/
belief be located at the conceptual level 
of value itself. “Faith in the prophets,” 
which forms Rapley’s central point of 
attack, must remain central to the progress 
of all science.) It shows rather convinc-
ingly that economic “truths,” like those 
of any other science, are historically con-
ditioned. It creates the theoretical space 
for new heresies. 
I will begin, however, by asking the 
reviewer a deceptively simple question. 
Why does Rapley succeed in achieving 
these commendable results? What is it 
about his prose that makes it so “lucid 
and high-paced”? (p 22) Since the facts 
themselves are not new, must we not 
conclude that the novelty of his endeav-
our lies entirely in its presentation? 
This is broadly what I argue here. In 
my view, Rapley’s success lies in nothing 
more than the felicity of his rhetorical 
arsenal. History falls into his prose as 
elegantly as it does only insofar as he 
turns economic principles into “cate-
chisms,” articles into “encyclicals” and 
experts into “gods.” Of course, under-
lying these multiple reversals is the 
theoretical black box called “faith” and 
its relationship with money—a deep 
conceptual problem for our times which 
he leaves unexplored. Since Persaud’s 
review also underplays this aspect, I use 
it to locate his fundamental misreading 
of the signifi cance of Rapley’s project. By 
limiting the “corruption of economics” 
to the (important but surface-level) 
problem of academic funding, he shirks 
from asking tough conceptual questions 
about belief and value theory. And in 
so doing, he inadvertently arrests the 
development of economic thought by 
not being “heretical” enough.
Persaud’s Basic Criticism
Doubtless, Rapley’s basic premise is that 
schools of economic thought operate 
like religious sects, since the rise and 
fall of experts (read “gods”) depends on 
their capacity to create “miracles” in 
times of distress. To invoke one of the 
key examples of the book: though 
Keynesian statism initially seemed like 
a heretical gamble against the tenets 
of neoclassicism, it was eventually vin-
dicated by the realities of the post-war 
world. Be it Friedman, Greenspan or 
Singh, Rapley manages to show with 
equal ease how most economists oper-
ate within similar historico-political 
confi nes. Fear of being exiled brings them 
squarely into the service of power—a 
claim not far from Persaud’s own com-
ment on academic funding and lobby-
ism. In this context, it may seem evident 
that the predominant lesson of the book 
is that politicians and economists must 
be brought down from their high horses; 
that they must cease posturing as the 
knights-errant of universal and objective 
economic principles. 
To be sure, this is exactly where 
Persaud locates his primary criticism of 
the book. He uses the same historical 
moment as Rapley, only to draw a con-
trary conclusion—arguing that the very 
reason why the 2008 fi nancial crisis did 
not descend into a “great depression” 
was because of sound economic policy 
(that is economic “expertise”). From this 
he concludes that “the world is back to 
genufl ecting at the high priests of 
economics. If 2008 was the twilight for 
the money gods, the night was short.” 
His rejoinder to Rapley is therefore 
simple—“high-priests” are necessary for 
any theoretical discipline to take root, 
and economics is no exception. What 
must be blamed instead, he adds, are 
the fi nancial structures and incentives 
which determine academic output. “Even 
the hardest sciences”, he says, “can be 
corrupted by their funding.” This is surely 
an oversimplifi cation of the matter. But 
allow me to return to this after a brief 
conceptual detour.
On Money and Faith
I must fi rst clarify my own position 
vis-à-vis Rapley’s book. It is by all meas-
ures a historical and not a theoretical 
account in my view. What is both novel 
and brilliant about it is its form, that is, 
the very language of “apostasy,” “heresy” 
and “proselytisation” in which it tells the 
history of economic thought. This is 
precisely what accounts for its coherence 
and readability; as well as its wonderful 
ability to make the reader see how the 
failings of one school are inseparable 
from its historico-political context and 
also (perhaps more importantly) from 
the birth of rival factions and successors. 
However, the inability of the narrative 
to go beyond this outward change of 
form is also the book’s central failing. 
One could argue that, conceptually 
speaking, it both begins and ends with 
Thomas Kuhn’s insights on the struc-
tures of scientifi c progress. Even as a 
footnote in the very fi rst chapter alerts 
us to this intellectual debt, it is only 
towards the end that Rapley returns to 
general refl ections on economics qua 
science. Unfortunately, however, for a 
student of economic thought, these are 
too vague, too scattered, and often too 
moralistic to be of any real signifi cance. 
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In the age of bitcoins, derivative 
 fi nance and demonetisation, a book-length 
account of money and faith must surely 
go much further (for are these not the 
true heretical questions of our time?). 
How is it possible for a Prime Minister 
to untether money from value using 
nothing more than a single televised 
speech? Does it suffi ce to say in response 
that currency notes are simply glorifi ed 
IOUs (I owe yous)? Should we not push 
further and examine the inherently 
“promissory” nature of money itself?1 
That is to say, if money is simply a promise 
then how and wherefrom does it get its 
value? As Rapley highlights, the tradi-
tional (Smithian/Ricardian) answer to 
such questions lies in the notion of labour-
time (Rapley 2017). But we know from 
Sohn-Rethel’s pioneering work that 
labour-time itself (as a form of what he 
calls “social synthesis”) arises only with-
in an exchange relation, that is, when 
two commodity-owners confront each 
other.2 Marx too, while exploring the 
notion of “fetishism” famously highlights 
how the simplest commodity dwells in 
“metaphysical subtleties and theological 
niceties” (Marx 1990). 
Because of their sheer complexity nei-
ther of these segues can be fully devel-
oped here. Yet that is my point—the 
links between money and belief are at 
once more profound and far-reaching 
than Rapley allows. It is not enough to 
say that economic sects rely on the con-
tinuing faith of the people for their own 
legitimacy. One must also explore how 
each and every act of exchange conceals 
a hidden economy of beliefs. For in-
stance, when we pay the grocer for our 
vegetables we automatically believe that 
there is something inherent in the vege-
tables as well as in the currency notes. 
Our very action betrays the unconscious 
conviction that it is the equivalence of 
inherent values (contained in the vege-
tables and the paper currency) which 
facilitates exchange.3 In this way, we 
project onto the thing a property which 
we ourselves have created through our 
labour in production (just as we project 
onto god anthropomorphic qualities). Is 
this not Marx’s key insight—that the link 
between money and faith is purely qual-
itative, having nothing to do with the 
quantity of value embodied in a com-
modity? (pp 163–77) 
Signifi cance of Rapley’s Project
This is precisely where Persaud gets it 
wrong. It is not that our belief in some-
thing determines its economic value (if 
this were true the poor majority could 
simply will itself out of poverty). For 
similar reasons, it is inaccurate to say 
that “if enough people believe that 
bitcoin is valuable, then it will rise in 
value” (if this were the case then asset 
bubbles would never burst). Prices may 
depend on what people believe at a par-
ticular moment but the value of a com-
modity is an objective social fact: the 
labour-time socially necessary to pro-
duce it (p 129). To take a trite example: 
irrespective of what people believe the 
value of diamonds will never fall below 
those of pencils (unless of course a radi-
cal shift occurs in the production pro-
cesses of either). 
Because of this basic confusion Persaud’s 
review is contradictory if not schizo-
phrenic. On the one hand it celebrates 
Rapley’s intervention as a “fundamental 
critique of economics,” while on the other 
it defends economic models based on 
“diminishing returns” and “differential 
algebra,” ignoring that these are merely 
more sophisticated ways of measuring 
utility.4 The deeper truth of Rapley’s 
criticism is that subjective satisfactions 
and conscious beliefs cannot explain the 
quantity of value embodied in a com-
modity.5 And to this extent he is fully 
justifi ed in chastising the methodology 
of “orthodox economic modelling.”6 
For my own part, I do not consider 
Rapley’s work to be a successful critique 
of economic theory. It certainly raises 
very important questions for economics 
in our times (some of which I delineate 
in the next part) but it criticises the 
wrong limb of the money–faith nexus. I 
fi nd his central claim, that “by its very 
nature the success of an economic doc-
trine depends on our faith in it and our 
confi dence in the priesthood,” wholly 
disingenuous.7 Neither Kuhn nor Popper 
could support such a view. Scientifi c 
communities invariably cluster around 
a few core beliefs (their “paradigm” 
in the Kuhnian sense) which keep 
self-correcting over time through inter-
pretative debate, disagreement, criticism, 
and consequent factionalism (Kuhn 
1970). To imagine otherwise would be 
to set up an impossible demand—that of 
absolute knowledge and consensus over 
the object of study. 
Persaud is therefore right in saying 
that our faith in economic theory can-
not be shaken by Rapley’s intervention. 
Instead, what one requires today is a 
new round of heretical questioning, 
coupled with a profound reconstitution 
of the pantheon of economic gods. It is 
perhaps no historical accident that I 
have been relying so heavily on Marx’s 
work (is he not the heretical economist 
par excellence?). 
New Heresies
In short, it is inaccurate to locate the 
money–faith nexus at the level of con-
scious subjective action—a view that 
makes the whole Persaud–Rapley debate 
about “high-priests” largely irrelevant. 
The real challenge today is to shift this 
analysis to the conceptual bedrock of 
value theory.8 In this respect, a closer 
engagement with Marx’s theoretical 
universe becomes not only useful but 
necessary. Mainstream economists must 
reinvigorate his thesis that value (and 
money as its developed form) represents 
a social relation hidden from producers. 
In other words, they must rescue the 
notion of commodity fetishism from both 
its heretical obsolescence as well as its 
deep academic slumber. 
It may be useful here to rehearse the 
broad contours of such a (daunting, if not 
impossible) project. During an actual act 
of exchange, Marx claimed, we proceed 
as though value is internal to the object. 
Consequently, money starts representing 
value as its own inherent socio-natural 
property, distinct and isolable from the 
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concrete activity of social production 
(pp 164, 165). There are thus two distinct 
levels at play here—one, the material 
(socio-natural) level of actual commodi-
ties; and two, the (purely social) imma-
terial relations between commodity 
producers (Derrida 1994). Mindful of 
this distinction, new economics must 
develop ways of tackling question such 
as the following:
(i) What role does faith/belief play in 
sustaining the invisible/immaterial layer 
of production relations? 
(ii) What role does the legal superstruc-
ture play in maintaining this fi ction?
(iii) What does this shift (from the mate-
rial to the immaterial level) mean for a 
discipline fi xated on marginal utilities 
and subjective preferences? 
(iv) How should we study and disentangle 
the money gods that reside, in an uncon-
scious way, within every act of exchange? 
Rapley deserves credit not only for 
revealing the constitutive role of belief in 
economic theory, but also for doing so in 
highly accessible prose. His shortcoming, 
however, has been to abandon this project 
halfway, to refuse to examine the his-
torical evolution of the twin notions of 
money and belief in their complex inter-
relation. One must agree with Persaud 
that such an effort does little to dismantle 
the resilient and dynamic foundations of 
political economy itself. Rapley’s own 
account is ample evidence that economics 
will self-transform to withstand the his-
torical storm and stress of scientifi c 
development. The book is a must-read, 
no doubt, primarily because it gives the act 
of heresy center-stage in our most clois-
tered and inward looking social science. 
Anshuman Singh (anshuman.singh@apu.edu.in) 
teaches at the Azim Premji University, 
Bengaluru.
Notes
1  For a penetrating analysis of derivatives from 
this standpoint, see Arjun Appadurai: “Banking 
on Words: The Failure of Language in the Age 
of Derivative Finance,” London: University of 
Chicago Press, 2016. 
2  Alfred Sohn-Rothel, “Intellectual and Manual 
Labour: A Critique of Epistemology,” London: 
Macmillan Press, 1978, Ch 3, 4.
3  Supra No v, Ch 2. This key chapter distinguishes 
between a thought-abstraction and a real-
abstraction. For our present purpose it is the 
latter which is signifi cant insofar as it denotes 
the operation of a hidden objectivity in our 
very action. Crucially for Sohn-Rethel, the 
commodity-abstraction is produced by how 
we unconsciously act (in the world), not by 
what we consciously think (in isolation from 
the world). 
4  Utility must be located at the qualitative level 
of value—that which Marx calls “use-value,” 
Supra No vi, p 126.
5  Following Marx, we must fundamentally 
distinguish between value (socially necessary 
labour time) and price (its monetary expression).
6  In psychoanalytic terms, one could say that 
these models falsely privilege the subject of 
cognition over the subject of the unconscious. 
For a detailed exposition on how this distinc-
tion may be productively employed for contem-
porary rereadings of Marx, see Samo Tomsic, 
The Capitalist Unconscious: Marx and Lacan, 
London: Verso, 2015, Ch 1.
7  Supra No iv, p 403.
8  I see Appadurai’s aforementioned work as a 
move in this direction. 
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